Factual record. No finding of causation or responsibility is made here.
Bronagh English · 18 · 24 April 2025
The bank just before the turn.
Mud on a road can cause a driver to lose control. This page starts with the bank just before the turn, the exposed soil beside the carriageway, and the risk of material reaching the turning surface in heavy rain.
Exposed soil and loose material beside the approach. Detail of a family photograph taken on 1 May 2025, seven days after the crash. Open the full frame to see where this detail sits.
The photographs, the forensic findings and the road surface.
The family’s photographs show exposed soil and loose material beside the road. The Denis Wood Associates technical report, dated 25 July 2025, records in its background that it was understood to have been raining heavily on the evening of the crash.
DWA assessed the bend, junction and bridge. Its wet-road calculation uses stated grip assumptions; it concludes that a significant reduction from the posted limit was needed to negotiate the bend. It also finds warning signs justified and identifies previous wall damage or deterioration that facilitated a vehicle mounting it. These are engineering findings, not merely a personal account.
The Health and Safety Authority’s guidance for agricultural vehicles using public roads warns that muck can cause a motorist to lose control and discusses contamination in wet conditions. That is a recognised safety basis for examining material on this approach. It is general guidance, not a finding about the cause of this collision.
01 · The bank and the turning surface
Stage 01
Loose material beside the road before the turn.
The safety issue is the route from the exposed bank to the road surface: what could carry material onto the carriageway during rain, and what prevented or cleared it before the turn? This is a question about road contamination and control, not simply the appearance of the verge.
Look along the left edge in the wider photograph. The exposed earth follows the approach rather than appearing as one isolated patch. The sealed road, the rough strip at its edge and the face of the bank are three different surfaces sitting beside one another.
The detail at the top of this page shows stones and loose material at the foot of that face. The wider view gives them a setting: the roadside Bronagh approached before the turn. These are not photographs of a distant field or an unrelated construction site.
The HSA identifies muck on public roads as a loss-of-control hazard and calls for warnings and measures to prevent material reaching the road. That guidance supports examining containment, runoff, inspection and clearance here; it does not establish the amount or movement of clay on 24 April.
These photographs were taken after the crash. They show the physical setting, not the movement of material during the collision. DWA’s report assesses the locus and expressly does not investigate incident causation. Its reviewed text does not contain a specific finding that clay from this bank caused the collision or Bronagh’s turning difficulty. Any separate engineering conclusion on that mechanism needs its own attribution.
The approach in its wider setting. Family photograph, 1 May 2025, after the crash. The visible cones belong to that later photograph; they do not establish what was present on 24 April.
The open drain raises a separate protection issue. The family describes it as unprotected and “not acceptable at any level”. An answer about where water drains does not, by itself, answer what protection existed around the opening. The reviewed DWA report does not supply a drainage assessment; that issue needs location-specific evidence of its own.
For the drainage question, identify the actual route: where could water leave the carriageway, which inlet served that length of road, and where did it discharge? For the protection question, identify the edge arrangement and the assessment of any exposed drop or excavation. A general reference to roadside drainage does not locate those features in a photograph.
The council’s Internal Review Decision of 18 February 2026 says that the only drainage activity on L3151 was cleaning roadside-verge inlets. It separately says there were no specific drainage works on the bridge itself, and locates the 2025 road programme northwest of the bridge.
Those geographical distinctions matter. ‘On the bridge’ and ‘on the approach’ are not the same place. The answer does not itself map the inlets against the bank in the photographs, identify a dated job at that bank, or show what protection was in place there. It should not be shortened into either ‘the council denied all works’ or ‘the drainage question has been answered’.
What is needed is a location-specific account of the work and the drainage arrangement—not another argument over what the word ‘bridge’ includes.
Two family-supplied views show the roadside channel and road edge at the bend. No barrier is visible between the channel and the road in the photographed section.
Capture date not confirmed. “Left” describes these views, not Bronagh’s direction of travel.
Was this a permanent drain or an excavation still in progress? What protection, signs and inspections were specified? Could water or erosion have affected the road edge?
These are questions for the works records and an engineering assessment, not findings from photographs.
Regulation 55 addresses suitable barriers or secure covers for an accessible excavation, shaft, pit or opening near work where a fall liable to cause personal injury is possible. Regulation 97 is a separate roadwork provision addressing guarding, lighting, traffic signs and supervision where its roadwork trigger is met. The two provisions have different triggers, and the photographs do not establish which, if either, applied to this feature or work phase.
Closer view of the roadside channel and exposed soil. Screen controls cropped; original retained.Wider view of the roadside channel and bend. Black screenshot bars removed; vehicle registration obscured for privacy.
Locate the inlet and outlet that served the pictured approach.Identify the work, its date and the condition left at the road edge.Produce the inspection and any protection or traffic-management arrangements for that location.
The approach photograph brings the turn and junction into the same view. This is the transition Mike wants people to examine: the road ahead is not simply a continuation of the straight approach. There is a turn into the bridge environment.
His statement that there was no advance warning is not answered merely by pointing to a Yield sign. Yield controls concern priority at a junction. The separate question is what warned an approaching driver about the bend, the bridge and its damaged edge before reaching them.
The council’s Bridge Detail field records ‘Is Signage Present? No’. That is the council’s bridge-asset field—not an inventory proving that there was no sign of any kind anywhere on the approach. The held forensic assessment records Yield controls and separately considers advance warning or chevrons justified.
That distinction sharpens the question rather than weakening it: what advance warning was actually provided for this approach, and where? A proper answer would identify the warning, its position, its installation date and its condition. It would not substitute junction priority for an answer about advance warning.
For Bronagh, unfamiliarity with the road is part of Mike’s account. She could not bring a local driver’s knowledge of what lay ahead. That is why he insists that the warning question belongs before the turn—not only in a discussion afterwards.
The approach turn, photographed by the family on 1 May 2025. This is a later daylight view, not a reconstruction of Bronagh’s view in rain or darkness.
The missing stonework was on record before Bronagh died.
The wall question does not begin with a photograph taken after the collision. On 21 January 2025, the council’s engineering inspection recorded ‘Significant Damage’. That was 93 days before 24 April.
Read the description rather than stopping at the rating. It records four areas of missing stonework in the upstream wall and two in the downstream wall. It describes a five-metre collapsed length at the left-hand side on both upstream and downstream walls. It records the downstream capping as ‘partly removed’ and says work was required to the parapet walls.
A parapet is the wall at the bridge edge. Missing sections are not merely a question about how old stonework looks. They concern the physical edge beside the road. The record identifies damage and required work; it does not identify who removed any capping, and this account does not assign that act to anyone.
The family’s later photographs let readers see the kind of edge they are asking about. They are not substitutes for the January inspection and do not establish every part of the wall’s profile on the crash night.
The unanswered sequence is concrete: after that damage was recorded, what decision followed, what work was instructed, and what interim assessment or protection was considered? An inspection entry is evidence that a condition was recorded. It is not, by itself, evidence that the condition was repaired.
A later family photograph of the parapet, taken in 2026; exact month not established here. The pre-crash damage evidence is the separate council inspection dated 21 January 2025.The low stone edge in another family photograph from 2026. No height measurement or crash trajectory is inferred from this picture.
A repair year in a table is not a completed repair.
The older report records a principal inspection carried out on 7 March 2013. Its inspection pages carry a 25 February 2014 print date, and the report gives an issue date of 4 March 2014. The parapet schedule lists masonry repointing and masonry repair against 2017. Those are repair intentions in a historic schedule—not evidence that the work happened in that year.
The same report names 2016 for the next principal inspection. The council’s later Internal Review says that principal inspection did not take place because sufficient funding was not available. That is not the same as saying there was no later monitoring: the disclosed record also contains the June 2024 maintenance inspection and January 2025 engineering inspection.
Most importantly, the Internal Review of 18 February 2026 says the listed repair works had not been carried out to date. That is why a scheduled year cannot be presented as evidence of completed work.
The road-programme entries are a different record again. The later disclosure lists 2018 reconstruction and 2025 resealing over chainage ranges. Those entries are not dated site diaries for the bank in the photographs. Joining them to that exact ground requires the location plan, job scope and actual dates—not an assumption.
Principal inspection: 7 March 2013. Inspection-page print date: 25 February 2014; report issue date: 4 March 2014. Parapet repair items are listed against 2017.
Year named for the next principal inspection. The later council response says it did not proceed because sufficient funding was not available.
Maintenance inspection: overall Warning, with parapets marked Good. This is a different inspection type from the January record.
Engineering inspection: Significant Damage, missing and collapsed masonry, and parapet work required.
Bronagh died, aged 18—93 days after that engineering inspection.
Internal Review Decision says the listed repairs had not been carried out to date.
Start with the bank and the turn. Then read the rest of the road.
Start with the physical setting shown in the photographs, the heavy rain described in the forensic report’s background, and the recognised danger of contaminated roads. Examine the turning surface alongside DWA’s findings on the bend, warning signs and bridge wall.
The open drain requires a separate, location-specific examination of the opening and its protection. It is not a substitute for the question about material on the turning surface. The warning and wall findings must not push the bank into the background.
This page cannot reconstruct Bronagh’s final seconds from later daylight photographs. But it can refuse to reduce the record to the single fact that a car left a road. The approach, the warning information, the condition of the bridge and the response to recorded damage are all part of what the family wants examined.
A driver cannot install an advance warning, change a drainage arrangement or repair a bridge wall on arrival. Those are conditions encountered on the journey. The full record needs to be examined, with each finding credited to its source rather than the engineering evidence reduced to a personal view.
Show the work, the warning and the response—not just a general assurance.
Even the road number needs care. The council’s July 2026 disclosure identifies the bridge road as L3151 and distinguishes the separate L31011-0 cul-de-sac. Other records and maps use L3101. Records must be matched to the actual place; an answer about another length of road does not settle this one.
The next answers should identify the following, with dates and locations:
The work order and site diary for the pictured bank and road edge: what changed, who carried out the work, and when.The drainage layout serving that approach: inlets, outlets and the route from the carriageway, together with inspections of the arrangement.The warning and traffic-management arrangements: which signs or other measures, where they stood, and when they were in place.The response to the January damage inspection: the decision, work instruction and any interim assessment or protection.
The county’s road-safety debate belongs beside its road record.
The RSA recorded 16 road deaths in Tipperary in 2023, the highest county total that year. On 14 October 2024, Tipperary County Council unanimously adopted a motion asking that the new default speed limits should not apply universally across the county, but only where considered necessary.
The national rural-local-road change from 80 km/h to 60 km/h nevertheless took effect on 7 February 2025. The motion did not stop it. These dated records raise a public question about priorities; they do not establish the cause of Bronagh’s death. Nor does the 2023 figure claim that Tipperary is the highest county today.
I lost the person I loved here and I want everyone to see it.
Mike English, Bronagh’s father
Behind every record on this page is Bronagh—not a case number and not simply the subject of a road-safety argument. Her father is asking people to look carefully, read the evidence and support a full account of the road she faced.
If you have relevant first-hand information, photographs or dated records, use the information route. The published record is there to be examined, not to invite abuse of individuals.
Capping gone. The Council's inspection recorded it, 93 days before Bronagh died.
21 January 2025: Tipperary County Council's engineering inspection rated Killardry Bridge "Significant Damage", capping "partly removed", signage "No". Bronagh died at the bridge on 24 April 2025.
Council engineering inspection, 21 January 2025 · Family photograph
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The grass verge, grown level with the lowered wall.
The family's view: where the verge has grown level with the lowered wall, it forms a ramp onto it. The record does not establish who formed the verge, or when.
Family photograph, February 2026
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The drainage pipe at the bank.
The Council's review says the only drainage work on this road was cleaning the verge inlets. The family's timeline puts this pipe about ten days before the collision; its view: it cannot drain the road.
Family photograph, 1 May 2025 · Council internal-review decision, 18 February 2026
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Clay and stones from the open bank, on the tarmac.
Photographed 1 May 2025, a week after Bronagh died. The bank was left open; wet material from it is sitting on the road surface where cars pass.
Family photograph, 1 May 2025
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An open channel beside the bend.
An open channel along the roadside at the bend, photographed 1 May 2025. The family's view: it was left open with no barrier or warning sign. The photograph does not show when it was dug.
Family photograph, 1 May 2025
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The long open bank on the approach, the night it rained.
24 April 2025: Toureen's rainfall day recorded 21.5 mm (including hours after the collision). The family's view: this open earth bank, on the right driving to the bridge, destroys the road beside it in rain.
Met Éireann, Toureen, rainfall day 24 April 2025 · Family photograph
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Facing the bridge: the approach meets it at 90 degrees.
The Council's 2014 inspection records the approach skew at 90 degrees and a 4.8-metre carriageway; its January 2025 bridge inspection recorded signage "No". The turn she had to make is ahead.
Eirspan principal inspection, 4 March 2014 · Council engineering inspection, 21 January 2025 · Family photograph
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Imagine this road at night, in heavy rain.
The family's view: in the dark and heavy rain there were no warning signs, clay and stones on the road, and a broken bridge wall. Unmanaged Council roadworks made a dangerous road far worse.
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Councillor Máirín McGrath seconded the motion against a universal 60 km/h limit.
14 October 2024: Motion 2861 asked that the new 60 km/h rural default "not be universal across this County, but apply only in areas deemed necessary by this Council". Council engineers found no road they could recommend to stay at 80 km/h.
Full Council minutes, 14 October 2024, pp. 12–15
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James Swords is the Council's District Engineer for this district.
The family asks him and the Council: who managed the roadworks at Killardry, who received the January 2025 inspection, and why were there no warning signs?
District Engineer: Cahir–Cashel Municipal District minutes, 26 May 2025 and 25 May 2026
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The record is kept here.
Each photograph and document on these sites carries its source. Factual record. No finding of causation or responsibility is made here.
Cahir–Cashel road statistics Cahir–Cashel Deadly place to drive ↗ × Cahir–Cashel road statistics Road statistics · sourced comparison Cahir–Cashel: 3.03× the national road-death rate 1 January 2018–31 December 2023 (six complete calendar years) . In the full Tipperary–Cahir–Cashel Municipal District, including its rural areas, the derived annualized rate was 8.61 people killed per 100,000 residents , compared with 2.84 nationally . This is an area comparison relative to population, not a personal likelihood. This page uses the full municipal district, not the populations of Cahir and Cashel towns. The linked road-deaths map and record has broader coverage and a different purpose. The headline figures 23 people killed in 21 fatal-collision records in the district 8.61 annualized people killed per 100,000 residents 3.03× the State rate on this population basis 36.5% of County Tipperary’s deaths and 26.5% of its population; the district rate was 37.6% above the county rate. District results The district’s fixed Census 2022 population is 44,532 . The 23 people comprised 11 drivers, 5 passengers, 5 pedestrians, 2 motorcyclists . They were not all drivers. Annual district deaths were 6, 4, 1, 3, 3, 6 from 2018 to 2023. Scroll horizontally to read this table. Five Tipperary municipal districts District 2022 population Fatal-collision records People killed People killed per 100,000 per year Clonmel 25,003 10 13 8.67 Tipperary–Cahir–Cashel 44,532 21 23 8.61 Carrick-on-Suir 20,191 7 7 5.78 Nenagh 40,879 11 12 4.89 Thurles 37,290 8 8 3.58 Scroll horizontally to read this table. Annual people killed Year Tipperary–Cahir–Cashel County Tipperary State 2018 6 10 134 2019 4 13 140 2020 1 7 141 2021 3 10 132 2022 3 7 152 2023 6 16 179 County comparison National baseline: the Republic of Ireland recorded 878 people killed across a fixed Census 2022 population of 5,149,139 , an annualized rate of 2.84 per 100,000 residents over these six years. Tipperary recorded 63 people killed , a rate of 6.25 , ranking #2 of 26 counties behind Monaghan (6.38). Tipperary’s rate was 2.20 times the national rate. Scroll horizontally to read this table. All 26 counties, ranked by annualized rate; the CSO county aggregate does not supply mapped source-record counts Rank County 2022 population People killed Fatal-collision records People killed per 100,000 per year 1 Monaghan 65,288 25 — 6.38 2 Tipperary 167,895 63 — 6.25 3 Donegal 167,084 53 — 5.29 4 Roscommon 70,259 22 — 5.22 5 Louth 139,703 41 — 4.89 6 Cavan 81,704 23 — 4.69 7 Mayo 137,970 38 — 4.59 8 Offaly 83,150 22 — 4.41 9 Kerry 156,458 41 — 4.37 10 Kilkenny 104,160 27 — 4.32 11 Leitrim 35,199 9 — 4.26 12 Longford 46,751 11 — 3.92 13 Westmeath 96,221 22 — 3.81 14 Clare 127,938 29 — 3.78 15 Meath 220,826 49 — 3.70 16 Sligo 70,198 15 — 3.56 17 Limerick 209,536 44 — 3.50 18 Wexford 163,919 34 — 3.46 19 Galway 277,737 49 — 2.94 20 Carlow 61,968 9 — 2.42 21 Cork 584,156 83 — 2.37 22 Laois 91,877 12 — 2.18 23 Waterford 127,363 15 — 1.96 24 Wicklow 155,851 18 — 1.92 25 Kildare 247,774 25 — 1.68 26 Dublin 1,458,154 99 — 1.13 A higher district comparator Boyle Municipal District, County Roscommon, recorded 15 people killed in 14 source records from a population of 24,421: 10.24 per 100,000 , about 19% higher than Tipperary–Cahir–Cashel. This is not a claim that Boyle is Ireland’s worst district; 11 districts were screened in this targeted comparison. Clonmel’s 8.67 rate is marginally higher than Cahir–Cashel’s 8.61; the largest raw count is not the highest district rate. Public council minutes: 2024–2026 These later public records are separate from the 2018–2023 statistical comparison. They record requests, responses and planned work—not findings of causation or proof that work was completed. 2025-05-26 James Swords: recorded response to a safety request The minutes record Councillor John O’Heney asking for safety measures following a recent tragic incident. James Swords is listed as District Engineer present; the response is attributed to that role. Limit: The minute does not name the bridge or specify a parapet repair. It does not say that Gardaí were to design or direct a bridge repair. there is an ongoing Gardai investigation into the incident and if there are any recommendations from the report it will be implemented. Excerpt from the minutes, not a verbatim speech transcript. Official minutes — attendance and District Engineer, PDF p. 1 — Officials Present; James Swords, District Engineer Official minutes — District Engineer’s report, PDF p. 5 — Item 3.4, District Engineer’s Report Official minutes — recorded response, PDF p. 6 — Item 3.4, District Engineer’s Report 2024-10-14 Máirín McGrath seconded the default-speed-limit motion Motion 2861 was proposed by Cllr Niall Dennehy and seconded by Cllr Máirín McGrath, a Cahir LEA member. The full County Council recorded unanimous agreement. The motion sought selective application of the new default limits, rather than universal application across the county. Limit: This was not a motion introducing a blanket 80-to-60 reduction. The December clarification below records the legal-advice referral. Official October minutes — Motion 2861, PDF p. 12 — Item 8.2, Notice of Motion Ref. 2861 Official October minutes — unanimous outcome, PDF p. 15 — Notice of Motion Ref. 2861 outcome Official Council AGM minutes — elected-area roles, PDF p. 2 — Item 2.1, elected members by electoral area 2024-12-09 Council clarification and legal advice The minutes record Chief Executive Sinéad Carr acknowledging support for Motion 2861, while explaining that legal advice was being sought on whether a plenary motion could supersede national legislation. The October minutes were to be amended to reflect that clarification. Limit: This does not establish a road-specific exception or a suspension of national rules. Official December minutes — clarification, PDF p. 2 — Item 3.1, Matters Arising on October minutes 2025-01-13 80-to-60 implementation and weather-delayed signs The minutes record 7 February 2025 as the commencement date for the rural-local-road default reduction from 80 to 60 km/h. They also record severe weather delaying sign-installation work and distinguish a later, wider Phase 2 review. Limit: This is a dated implementation note, not proof of the limit or weather at any individual crash site. Official January minutes — Speed Limit Review, PDF p. 11 — Item 7.1, Roads, Transportation, Health & Safety 2026-05-25 477 district bridges; 14 applications; three funded The District Engineer reported €1 million in county bridge funding, 477 bridges in the district, applications for 14 bridges requiring work and funding for three. Limit: The minute does not establish whether Killardry was among the 14; funding is not proof of completed work. Official May 2026 minutes — bridge funding, PDF p. 6 — Item 3.6, District Engineer’s Report 2026-05-25 Temporary measures considered at Rehill Bridge Following Cllr Máirín McGrath’s request for urgent rehabilitation, the District Engineer reported that Rehill tender documents were nearly complete and temporary measures were being considered to reopen the bridge, with completion hoped for by the end of that week. Limit: This records a plan and expectation, not verified completion. Official May 2026 minutes — Rehill Bridge, PDF p. 6 — Item 3.6, District Engineer’s Report The earlier bridge inspection The family’s published summary of Council inspection record TY-L3151-B-010 reports “Significant Damage” on 21 January 2025 and records downstream capping as “partly removed”. That inspection predates both the 24 April 2025 collision and the 26 May 2025 meeting response. Limit: This is a summary of a Council record held on file, not the original report online. The records checked do not establish whether or when James Swords personally received or read the inspection report. Published family summary of the Council inspection record When was the inspection circulated to the district engineering team, and what action was recorded? Further accountability research Read the full sourced record on the primary statistics page . Representatives Engineering Payments Road budgets Crash coverage Weather Surfaces and works Exposure comparisons Method and limits People killed ÷ fixed 2022 population ÷ 6 years × 100,000. Populations are fixed Census 2022 references. Counts concern collision locations, not resident addresses; the result is not a rate per journey or vehicle-kilometre. Current 2024 reference boundaries are applied retrospectively. The series is provisional and subject to revision. The figures do not establish why crashes happened or measure road-maintenance spending. Return home · Open the broader road-deaths map and record Sources RSA SourceData — Map of Collisions source data — Fatal-collision source records, 2018–2023; mapped locations assigned to current reference districts. CSO ROA15 — Persons Killed and Injured — State and county people-killed totals, 2018–2023; provisional/revisable series. CSO ROA12 — All road users — Independent national cross-check of people-killed totals, 2018–2023. CSO Census 2022 Table 8.1 background notes — State and county 2022 population background. CSO FY108 — official statutory LEA population CSV — 2022 population basis and statutory LEA/district mapping. Tipperary County Council Adopted Budget 2024, Table 7 (PDF) — Five municipal-district populations labelled as based on Census 2022; physical page 20. Tailte Éireann 2024 statutory boundary dataset service — Checked 2024 Tailte Éireann statutory municipal-district boundary dataset service; current reference boundaries applied retrospectively. Irish Statute Book S.I. 631/2018 — Optional Boyle municipal-district/LEA mapping context. Download the five-district CSV · Download the 26-county CSV · Download the public JSON snapshot Factual record. No finding of causation or responsibility is made here.
Contact the family
If you have information about this road, this bridge, or the records on this site, you can write to Bronagh's family here.
